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ABSTRACT
In highland Papua New Guinea wealth distribution after a windfall is
typically concealed by the donor. This trend was made easier by the
introduction of state-issued currency, such that wealth reckoning and
especially distribution preferences are often shrouded in mystery. The
researcher set out to learn how denomination structures those money
transfers by employing a semi-structured interview method centered
around hypothetical distributions based on everyday encounters. Across
four tailored ‘scenarios,’ fifteen Papua New Guinean participants dwelt
on who to give money to, why, and under what conditions.
Observations are made about the driving forces in distribution practices,
the pecuniary conception of certain relationships’ importance, and
relationships that turn on local conceptions of how to capitalize on the
way money operates, thus demonstrating the utility of a culturally
sensitive quantitative methodology.
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Article
Social studies of money are a vibrant and growing field of interdisciplinary inquiry, one that re-
inscribes money with the social relations it is often perceived to lack (see Dodd 2014, Nelms and
Maurer 2014, Holbraad 2017). Pioneers in sociology (Zelizer 1997), literary criticism (Shell 1995),
law (Desan 2005) and anthropology (Guyer 2004) have removed the veil of economic reductionism
and described how money economies institute their values and biases, and how these attributes
change across space, over time and within populations. This paper investigates hidden distribution
practices with an eye towards a structuring factor affecting the cultural malleability of money: uneven
access to denominations. By denomination I refer to the way that money is instantiated as cash in
specific units of value (e.g. 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100), the mathematical relationship between those
units, and the asserted substitutability of one such unit for any other combination of units bearing
the same numerical value. Denominations appear static in their numerical relationship to one
another; they are unbending, hard numbers, but insights from both social psychology and economics
have demonstrated how the lived reality of denomination confounds this adage (e.g. Kameda et al
2002, Sargent and Velde 2002, Collins et al. 2009). Following in the tradition of anthropological
enquiry, the present contribution stresses culturally generative possibilities, particularly those cre-
ated in interaction with the structuring role of monetary denomination in livelihood strategy (see
also Pickles 2013a, 2017).
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The article pushes experiments with enumeration to the forefront of its description, foreground-
ing how field methods can occupy the numerical while continuing to champion human specificity
(see also Verran 2001, Pickles 2009, Stafford 2009). In this way I hope to complement anthropolo-
gical investigations of number that derive their analytical purchase frommythical exegesis or histori-
cal documentation (e.g. Mimica 1988, Guyer 2004). Hann argues we need anthropological thinking
to create insightful, reflective quantifications (2006, p. 220); in turn we would offer anthropologically
astute tools to academic practices that lie beyond our current disciplinary boundaries, and open
wider domains of interdisciplinary collaboration (e.g. Larøi et al 2014). It is by now well-established
that numbers are culturally achieved, variable, but invariably fundamental, and here I try to generate
understanding from the process of adapting one’s methods to account for our subjects’ numerical
sensibilities.
I am motivated to do so by a combination of personal experience and fieldwork interests. My field
work in Papua New Guinea focuses on the importance of gambling in contemporary economic life
when gambling was once unknown in the region (Pickles 2019). Before getting to the field I therefore
already had a broad interest in how transactions were conceptualized and, given that I found much of
gambling winnings was said to be distributed, I became increasingly preoccupied with how winners
calculated their distributions. When I investigated the importance of denominational thinking in
transactions, I felt limited by intuitive methods, eventually trying various methodological prompts.
I was emboldened to attempt to derive ethnographic insight from numerical methods because I had
previously conducted a reanalysis of the quantitative research of the Cambridge Anthropological
Expedition to Torres Straits in 1898 in the light of later ethnographic material from the region
(Pickles 2009). In the knowledge that Papua New Guinea was home to highly original numerical
practices (e.g. Biersack 1982, Wassman and Dasen 1994), I was quite sure that an ethnographically
informed method that prompted numerical reflection would yield important data. Those methodo-
logical prompts that form the basis of this article concentrated on who specific denominations are
given to and what relationship these denominations have to the overall quantities transferred during
distribution.1
I devised a set of scenarios in a task that I called skelim gem (lit. ‘measuring/deciphering/distri-
buting game’2) in the lingua franca Tok Pisin. It consists of simplified versions of real life town situ-
ations I encountered such as coming across people and groups on the street, and negotiating
distributions during lifecycle rituals, and what I imagined to be logical inversions of those encoun-
ters, or disjunctively unusual situations. These situations challenged people to think strategically
about their distributions while dealing with the stimulus of limiting denominations. The game
gave me a range of prompts and problems, at which point I could ask questions in order to get at
the principles and/or pragmatics people brought to bear upon their distribution practices. It was
both very quantitative and involved a good deal of reflective discussion that invited participants
to become self-analysts in understanding the challenges that denominations pose.
The method worked best as a prompt for reflection and discussion. People openly speculated sim-
ultaneously on the nature of their relationships to specific people and to specific monies. Over the
course of these semi-structured explorations I learnt how people ranked the importance of distribut-
ing to different kinds of people, the expression and acknowledgement of the public gaze through
careful use of denomination, the gendering of denominations and their use; about the threshold
denomination K5 and its use as a marker of significance, the ‘earmarking’ of large denominations
and strategies to keep hold of them (see Zelizer 1997); the importance of gambling friends and
denominations appropriate to them, the balance between desired gifting in Marcel Mauss’ sense
and the importance of physical presence as a prompt to ‘demand sharing;’ and the importance of
small denominations as an enabler to flexible decision-making. I am quite certain that without
the skelim gem my conception of Papua New Guinean currency pragmatics would have been
seriously impoverished. This article therefore has a double focus: describing distribution as it was
revealed through my findings and highlighting when denomination mattered to it; and, relating
the utility of this kind of method for anthropological fieldwork. I begin therefore with a description
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of the continuing importance and complexity of distribution practices in this part of Papua New
Guinea and the competing imperatives that enliven it.
The ethnographic context
Male dominated ceremonial live pig, cooked pork and shell wealth distributions populate the initial
economic anthropological literature of Highland Papua New Guinea of the 1960s (A. Strathern 1969,
1971). A vast and complex body of work on economics, exchange, and sharing in the PNGHighlands
has since emerged (see Pickles 2019). The most palpable and persistent trope across core Highland
PNG societies over time is the strong focus on the aggregation and distribution of wealth objects. The
centrality of aggregation and distribution has come to be signified by the term ‘gift exchange’, or
more critically, ‘so-called gift exchange’ (M. Strathern 1991, see also Pickles in press). The indisso-
lubility of ‘gift exchange’ (or more accurately: reciprocally entangled wealth transfers) with person-
hood formation, gender distinctions, cosmology and even space-time in Papua New Guinea
cosmologies have had a profound effect upon anthropological representations of the economy
and its embeddedness in the lived experience of people well beyond the region. In this particular
case, I will focus upon how distribution manifests decision-making and people’s always taxing
imperatives toward either demonstrating venerated values or fulfilling their own and their close
kin’s material needs and desires.
While some aggregation-exchange-distribution formats have long since disappeared (Stewart and
Strathern 2002), mortuary and bridewealth payments have ballooned, while political campaigns, and
school fee and compensation payments have become new avenues and now occupy much of people’s
attention. Over the same period the media of exchange have narrowed from an array of transactables
that included cuscus pelts, feathers, dog’s teeth, pig tusks, pearl shells, cowries and snail shells to pri-
marily focus upon money along with pork and/or other cooked meats, live pigs, net bags and garden
produce. Discussions of events and of everyday life have remained fiercely financial even if the kinds
of occasions and even patterns of distribution have diverged (see Sexton 1986, Akin and Robbins
1999, Martin 2013). For all the changes wrought upon PNG Highlanders by exogenous forces
and their own experimental gestalt, the centrality of transaction and its capacity to elicit meaning
is steadfast.
One constant theme in the regional literature at large and an inescapable part of large scale dis-
tributions is the strong tension between the desire to stand out and the need to demonstrate equality
(e.g. Read 1959). This tension plays out intensely as wealth is allocated, where fear of recipients’ dis-
satisfaction can be crippling (Leroy 1979). In earlier publications I have showcased the contemporary
importance of pockets in conjunction with concealable cash in efforts to manipulate expectations
and thus exceed them with your donations (Pickles 2013a); I have also described how electronic
spreadsheets are used by some enterprising PNG Highlanders to strip valuables of the affective
hold they have on recipients and impose equality (Pickles 2017); lately I discuss how street sales
and centralized markets contribute to the specialization of emergent relationship-contriving trans-
action practices (Pickles 2019). In each of these publications and in the present effort, I try to elicit
the dynamics of innovation that are an inexorable part of transaction practices and the tensions
underlying them in Highland Papua New Guinea, and which make themselves abundantly apparent
in the urban Melanesian experience.
Urban Papua New Guinea places particular financial constraints on its residents, provoking novel
social forms (Rew 1974, Oram 1976, Goddard 2005). Famously Marilyn Strathern used the title ofNo
Money on Our Skins to draw attention to the prominence of financial pressures in Highlanders’
experience of their capital city (M. Strathern 1975). Urban life for the migrant is characterized
then, and today, by the dependent visiting relative from the village who must be sated, and by fre-
quent chance encounters and the ensuing need to maintain and manage a great number of small-
scale give-and-take relationships. The result (for most) is a perennial shortage of ready cash, or
money on their skins. What is more, urban Papua New Guineans experience with sources of cash
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money has more ups and downs than the average. Unexpected windfalls come from remittances,
corruption, gambling, and salaries that go unpaid over months or years and are suddenly back
paid in part or in full.
An acute generalized uncertainty about money centers on where it is sourced; how much one
attained; was it already spent? And no wonder, because today’s windfalls are far more valuable
and thus potent than the windfalls of game from hunting and livestock from feasting that predate
them (cf. Rappaport 1984). The cost of bridewealth payments is the main event used to track this
inflationary process in both my urban and my rural field site. Mothers of married daughters
described a tripling, quadrupling or quintupling of monetary costs between their own bridewealth
and their daughters. If the daughter had more education than the mother, one could expect even
more. It is beyond my capabilities to assess the real cost differences across generations given the
different valuables used, but everyone is aware that the events have become more expensive with
respect to purchasing power. Yet, despite the increasing volumes of wealth aggregating at moments
in people’s lives, the reality is that wealth has simultaneously become less visible, not more
Like the exchangeables preceding them, PNG moneys are iconographically striking, colorful, and
gorgeous (Figure 1), and they are appreciated as such by Papua New Guineans (Foster 2002). Playful
descriptive names given to different denominations in the lingua franca Tok Pisin include calling a
K1 coin a wasa because the hole in the middle makes it look like a washer, and also, light-heartedly,
to express how insignificant its purchasing power is. The blue K10 note is sometimes called solwara
(‘saltwater’, i.e. the sea); the K20 is known as a het blo pik (‘pig’s head’) because the head features
prominently on the reverse side of that note. K50 is the only note to feature a person, first Prime
Minister Sir Michael Somare, and it is known affectionately and/or mockingly as the lapun man
(‘old man’).
Robert Foster points out that money’s iconography signifies an emergent Papua New Guinean
nationalism, and here I would add that denomination provides a readily identifiable common voca-
bulary for signifying social place and making value judgements. In Goroka Town, where I have con-
ducted seventeen months of ethnographic fieldwork, a denomination-centred pragmatics has
developed around the distribution of money in response to these financial conditions. Denomination
pragmatics finds expression through pockets and spreadsheets and marketing practices. And yet cen-
tral to contemporary pragmatics is the desire for secrecy and its facilitation through concealable cur-
rency, presenting a methodological conundrum. Contemporary wealth calculations and
distributions were clearly important, but very often impossible to record.
Monetary distribution in Goroka coincides with the payment of wages at workplaces or at the
bank, and distributions also occur at markets and slot machine joints, on the street and at peace cer-
emonies, and at lifecycle events often held within the boundaries of the urban house. Goroka is a
town in one of the world’s most rural countries, and as such distribution often flows from town
to village, after rural-based public servants have returned from town with their pay. Visitors and
locals also collect together in town to gamble, leading to subsidiary distributions. At the time of
Figure 1. The reverse side of the 2015 issue Papua New Guinea Twenty Kina.
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field work 73 per cent of Gorokans gambled. Gambling occurs primarily through card games, which
are illegal and played under houses, in markets and on informal settlement street corners. There are
also five high stakes slot machine joints and one bookies. Somewhat like workplaces, these were
locations where people with money were sought out by those who expect a slice.
People with money are often faced with the demands of family, friends, and etcetera and must
make decisions about how to conceal/reveal the wealth they carry and, if revealed, how to respond
to such distributional demands and allocate value. PNG people have particular ways of making those
important distribution decisions, and denomination directly shapes (while not fully determining)
those choices. Specifically, denomination structures the form of the value to be distributed, requiring
a method that directly addressed that form so as to capture how people thought through their
distributions.
The game and participants
I filmed the skelim gem with fifteen people over 2009–2010, always at the end of a semi-structured
interview that typically lasted an hour and a half, and after refreshments; by this point we were both
generally relaxed and conversant. It was conducted in complete privacy either within my own
accommodations or in two cases in a location of the participant’s choosing.
A participant was told that there are four different scenarios, one after another, in which they
meet people after they have won at gambling. They were given a card representing them named
Yu Yet (lit. ‘you yourself’) together with 250 matches taped together into a variety of ‘denomina-
tions:’ two 50s, four 20s, three 10s, five 5s, five 2s, and five 1s.3 The pile was handed over unsorted
and the participant given a minute or so to go through them. They were told they would encounter
quite a few people and offered the chance to change one of the K50s at a shop for K49 in two K20s,
one K5, and two K2s. (Charging for change is common practice in PNG.) Eleven participants elected
to make this cash sacrifice to lubricate distribution, and their decision carried across all four scen-
arios. I explained that the Yu Yet card would represent them and that the money they didn’t give
away would be theirs. Then we went through the following four scenarios.
Individuals (Scenario 1): the participant has won at cards or slot machines; they are walking back
home, and will meet people individually on the way. They can give them some money if they wish.
Nineteen different cards with words like ‘mother’ or ‘pastor’ on them are then presented to the par-
ticipant individually and at random. I ask what if anything they will give them, why, together with
follow up questions. If interviewees don’t have a ‘pastor’ or ‘mother’ for instance, they are free to
either imagine they do or remove the card.
Small groups (Scenario 2): the same premise is given, but this time on their walk the participant
meets people in groups. They are given random groupings of cards two, three, or four at a time. No
new cards are introduced in this or any following scenario, but the participant is not told so. Both
individuals and small groups represent recognizable everyday decisions.
Ambush (Scenario 3): each interviewee is instead told they have won this money on a big annual
horserace. They return home only to find that all the same people are waiting for them at home (in
the form of all the cards randomly spread around the respondent), and everyone there knows
exactly how much they have won. The participant is asked to say what they would do and
group monies accordingly. This scenario was intended to ape traditional distribution patterns
in public places.
Free play (Scenario 4): as in the third, the cards are spread at random, but only as an aide to
memory, participants have free rein to see whoever they wish, tell who they want, in the order
and groupings they prefer, and to avoid anyone they want to dodge. None of them are aware of
the win and need not find out. By this point participants usually express relief, and they seem
to enjoy this scenario, and in particular the opportunity to sidestep difficult decisions. Free play
was a deliberately fictitious scenario designed to bring out participants ranked preferences inde-
pendent of any situation.
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Table 1 lists the categories of people that were written on the playing cards I used. Aside from
limiting the denominations on offer, participants were free within the confines of the scenarios to
act in any way they wished, for instance to go and buy beer for all the people present in the
ambush scenario, or in the small groups scenario to give money to one person in a group and
to tell that person to buy lunch for the others.4 Bundled matches are an unfaithful representation
of actual denominations with none of their beauty or beguiling affective qualities, therefore posing
questions of validity. I had to choose between using real money and giving away a lot of money to
the participants; or using the money and not giving it away; or trusting participants to act as if a
substitute represented denominations. I knew that the first two options would color all our future
encounters so for better or worse I chose the latter. I felt satisfied that participants were deliber-
ating seriously enough with the contrived denominations that I could derive value from the
exercise.
The fifteen participants were from a broad but not representative range of backgrounds. They
ranged as far west as Enga Province and as far east as Lufa District, Eastern Highlands Province,
all within the Papua New Guinea Highlands as defined by DK Feil (1987). There were ten men
and five women; two of the women and seven of the men were married; two married men and
one married woman were wed in the last couple of years, the rest had longstanding marriages. All
were twenty or older. Two women were separated from their husbands long-term, supporting them-
selves financially. One of the men was wed to his third consecutive wife; three other men had two
wives. Three women and seven men were in employment, and another man owned a business.
Three men and two women were regular churchgoers. Three women and two men never attended
a place of worship. The rest fell somewhere in-between. Of those who professed a religious
affiliation of some kind, two belonged to a Christian church but I failed to learn which, two were
Catholic and one was a Seventh Day Adventist. These are among the longest standing churches
in the area. The rest were adherents of newer Pentecostal churches. Religiosity is important not
just because it colored how much people donated to their pastor, but because church
communities frequently attempted to short circuit kinship obligations and create their own total
communities within which all transactions are directed by Christian practice and focused upon
church activities.
All except one woman were long-time residents of Goroka or had lived in a number of towns, and
Goroka was always a significant distance from their ancestral villages. It is also important to note that
twelve of the fifteen participants were gamblers and thus presumably had some experience with
Table 1. Cards given to participants during the skelim gem.
As written in Tok Pisin English Translation
Yu Yet You
Mama karim yu Mother
Daddy bilong yu Father
Pikinini meri bilong yu Daughter
Pikinini man bilong yu Son
Daddy bilong daddy bilong yu Father’s father
Clansman bilong yu Clansman
Tribesman bilong yu Tribesman
Chief bilong lain bilong yu Head of your clan/tribe
Meri/man bilong yu Spouse
Brata bilong meri/man bilong yu Spouse’s brother
Susa bilong meri/man bilong yu Spouse’s sister
Brata bilong mama bilong yu Mother’s brother
Friend em wan size long yu Friend of equal status
Friend em bikpela long yu Friend of senior status
Friend em liklik long yu Friend of junior status
Wanwok bilong yu Colleague
Man em givim yu mani taim em win lo kas/pokies Person who gives you money when they win at cards/slot machines
Pastor bilong yu Pastor
Man/meri yu no save lo em Stranger
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winnings, and this conforms to ordinary levels of gambling participation according to the surveys I
conducted during fieldwork (Pickles 2019). Having outlined how skelim gem worked and given basic
sociological information on the participants, I now contextualize the approach and anticipate its
shortcomings.
Methodology
Skelim gem contains a number of formal elements, and I think it is necessary to explore them in case
a reader decides to emulate the method. Research Methods in Anthropologymight put the skelim gem
under the banner of a quasi-experiment because I chose my participants rather than selecting them
randomly, and a field experiment, because it was done outside of a laboratory (Bernard 2006, p. 110).
None of the four different scenarios acted as a control; they were all variations upon the theme of
distribution. A natural experiment would have been if I kept a record of real life distributions of gam-
bling winnings that happened to occur under different circumstances. In fact skelim gem was born
out of frustration that these real distributions were not observable, and so I manufactured a reality in
which decisions like them could be witnessed.
Experimental economics is an emergent field with some conceptual overlap to the skelim gem.
Pioneered by Smith (1982), and later Henrich (2000), experimental economics take prisoners
dilemma type games (dictator game, ultimatum game, public goods game) outside of the laboratory,
away from undergraduate students and into the global south. These studies claim that stinginess is
often more apparent outside of the global north than we might expect, and suggest a clear correlation
between participation in the market and ‘fair-mindedness’ (Ensminger 2002). Experiments con-
ducted by Tracer showed that contrary to this larger trend, in Papua New Guinea there exists a ten-
dency toward ‘hyper-fair’ distributions (2003, see also Oosterbeek et al. 2004). The focus on
comparative and evolutionary frameworks in such work orients the analysis toward the abstract. I
am using similar techniques to embed decisions within local specifics of enumeration, kinship
and organization. In form, implementation, and in the kinds of knowledge it claims to elicit, the ske-
lim gem is therefore dissimilar to these kinds of experiment.
In certain of its characteristics and certainly if performed under laboratory conditions the skelim
gem resembles an experiment, but as a fieldwork method it is more at home under the loose category
of the semi-structured interview: it used a mixture of formal requirements, free conversation and the
advantage of privacy. A set of hypothetical between-you-and-me situations allowed people to explore
variations upon natural conditions in Goroka. Each had some elements of real-life distributions
accentuated and some missing. In scenarios where participants were confronted with groups of
people that they had to value either publicly or in private, the experiment took on a loosely ‘cultural
domain analysis’-like structure. A ‘cultural domain analysis’ is where a number of people are asked to
sort things, and the sorting is analyzed for similarity across various cultural divisions. The most fam-
iliar cultural domain analysis method is probably the triad test. Triad tests ask which one of a trio of
terms (such as ‘car,’ ‘taxi,’ and ‘bus’) is the most different or which two are the most similar; the ske-
lim game pivoted upon similar distinctions, but those distinctions were expressed through the
restricted scaling technique allowed for by having a limited number of different denominations
(Bernard 2006, p. 307).
The participant’s circumstances were not altered from one scenario to the next (e.g. by offering a
reward for distributing in a certain way). One possible bias (which is particularly pronounced in triad
tests) therefore is ‘order effects’, the order of the questions condition later responses upon earlier
ones. In the skelim gem the desire to act somewhat consistently may have affected the results,
and, from the end of individuals (scenario one) onwards expectations of who they would encounter
primed participants not to give away too much money too early. I therefore chose to order the scen-
arios as I did for three reasons: (1) Experiencing the small groups and individuals scenarios before the
latter two does not introduce any new bias, whereas ambush and free play (scenarios where partici-
pants met everyone simultaneously) would prematurely reveal to participants who they would meet.
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(2) I judged the free play scenario to potentially introduce the most bias, and so it had to go at the
end. (3) I put Individuals first because it is less complicated than small groups.
During the free play scenario (4), when they were given the chance to order all the cards as they
wished, more than half of the participants (nine) did some pile sorting, the most common practices
were grouping mothers and fathers together (six participants), removing all non-recipients (five par-
ticipants), and grouping sons and daughters together (five participants). Pile sorting presents
participants with a range of concepts/objects and asks them to order them in a way which makes
sense to them; it can be very useful in determining conceptual distinctions. Pile sorting games play
on limited supply because in most cases an object is not allowed to go in more than one pile, meaning
that participants are forced to prioritize one out of any number of competing conceptualizations. Ske-
lim gem participants sorted people into groups that seemed to them to belong together for the pur-
poses of a distribution. Some participants also insisted on sorting people into groups during
ambush, imagining themselves taking a couple of people aside or waiting for someone to leave.
In addition to sorting people into categories, what resulted was a set of what Bernard calls simple
scales within and between categories of people (2006, pp. 318–320). The skelim gem is a device for
scaling people in two senses: (1) I assign participants a place on a scale based on the numbers they
respond with, and (2) participants are scaling the people I present to them. The conjunction of these
two senses means participants’ efforts to scale can be compared across participants and scenarios.
Specifically, the numbers that I asked people to assign to various people were supposed to represent
concrete moneys, so they appear to have ratio properties at a superficial level (someone assigned ten
is worth twice someone assigned five). One must simultaneously take into account that participants
run out of money as they go (inserting a deliberate order effect), and that the necessity to give to
some people is dependent on the context in which they are seen, and the perceived value that the
recipient will attach to the money they are given.
Ostensibly the skelim gem lacks both internal validity (not having randomized respondents) and
external validity (I did not replicate the same experiment). It is also subject to testing bias, where the
tested changes their answer because of the influence of the tester. Unlike other interview methods,
skelim gem could have been used in a more clinical, less ethnographically situated way, leaving my
attempt susceptible to criticism on the statistical side. I aimed instead to prompt ideas and make
reasoning explicit. Contextualized knowledge and in-depth discussions over why people made the
choices they made provide a different, complementary kind of data that gains its validity from its
explanatory power while speaking to more statistical, more focused practices of knowledge-making
(see Chibnik 1985, Stafford 2008).
Emphasizing the denomination problem in valuation situations can help people focus on money
as a problem of commensuration and distribution, making explicit the way they reason with denomi-
nation. An analogy would be when a researcher is doing pile sorting and uses drawings or photo-
graphs of a house or a fish etc. instead of using written words on the cards they hand out; this
subtle difference is known to change people’s focus from function (or other hidden attributes) to
form when they sort (Borgatti 1998, p. 133). The skelim gem stimulated participants to think
about people in terms of money not in a simple scalar numerical way, but through the way denomi-
nation actually constrains people’s daily activities. In this regard the skelim gem takes its lead from
the kind of research into everyday mathematics pioneered by Jean Lave in the United States (1988).
Reasoning with denomination was therefore both a situated practice to be studied and a shared
analytical project between researcher and research participants. This protracted exploration of meth-
odological flaws and potentialities should temper the following attempt to extract insights from the
results I obtained.
Results
Every skelim gem spawns up to eighty numbers in total and at least half an hour of commentary;
fifteen participants add up to 1200 individual figures; each figure elicits personal reflections and is
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complicated by the problematic of limited denominations. Dwelling on each facet in a journal article
is impossible and even covering more than a couple of trends for specific recipients are impractical. I
concentrate on overall patterns and later look briefly at one detailed case that holds particular
interest for my research: the gambling friend. To transform this mass of data into something visually
useful I had to telescope out, but graphs using the mean value across all participants (Table 2 and
Figure 2) hid many individual variations between participants. Mean values also obscure the way
one participant distributed to one person in the presence of specific others, which was, after all,
the point of having different scenarios.
Another visualization problem stemmed from the optically clunky nature of the results: the
amount participants kept (K109 on average) dwarfs the distinction between father (K16) and gam-
bling friend (K11), let alone between a mother’s brother who receives K4 and a stranger who receives
K2. Even excluding ego graphs remain exponential to the eye, masking all but the most obvious dis-
tinctions (see Figure 2). This was a problem because for both those making the distributions and the
Table 2. Mean distribution of winnings in Kina over four scenarios, along with the mean across all scenarios.
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people receiving there can be as much significance in the difference between a K2 note and a K5 note
as there is between a K50 and a K100 (especially so in company). The nature of denomination itself
obfuscates because denominations proceed numerically in a manner that looks exponential if plotted
onto a graph: 1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 50, and 100.
The solution was to present the tables raw, turning them into a visually intuitive ‘heat map.’ I
color the tile containing a particular value according to the highest denomination in Papua New Gui-
nea Kina that could be included in it. Any allocation over K100 is therefore purple-red, between K50
and K99 is bright red, K20 to K49 is red-orange, K10-K19 orange, K5-K9 yellow, K1-K4 pale yellow,
and giving nothing is colored pale blue.5 I call this way of conceiving the boundaries ‘___ and
change,’ by which I mean that every value from the point one denomination comes into play up
until the one above it can be used fall under the designation of that denomination (five and change).
For example K8 is considered five and change, K14 is ten and change, and K30 is twenty and change.
The resulting visualizations illuminate the fine-grained distinctions that people made when they only
gave over a small amount. It also conforms to the way that participants overwhelmingly gave in
rounded denominations when they could.6
Table 2 is a summary using mean values. The gradual and even shading of the table from bot-
tom to top demonstrates that participants discriminated between people with their money, effec-
tively ranking them consistently across scenarios. Participants allocated most money to themselves,
followed by mothers, spouses and fathers. Children are less favored, and daughters do better than
sons.
As your eyes move left to right through the first three scenarios, from individuals through to small
groups and then to ambush, more of the mid-table area is colored bright yellow. The number of
people receiving five and change (K5-9) increases, encompassing people of greater and of lesser sta-
tus. The self, mother, spouse, and particularly the father are less susceptible to this trend whereas
others (the gambling friend, the daughter, son, father’s father, and the head of one’s clan/tribe)
are vulnerable to having their allocation reduced in order to equalize the field. The explicit reasoning
was that one’s immediate family helps the winner all the time, not just sometimes. The father receives
more during public distributions because there is an expectation that fathers should have their roles
acknowledged in situations where one is distributing to kin, but when one is distributing to groups of
Figure 2. An abortive graph containing average distributions to participants across scenarios.
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outsiders on behalf of the clan a ‘father will be happy to have his money used in the family’s distri-
bution to others.’
Conversely, strangers seem immune to being considered worthy of an equal share even during
ambush, while the tribesman, clansman, and junior friend receive a bump up towards the expanding
five and change bracket. Increasing the number of people at a given distribution also increases the uni-
formity or equality of that distribution. The same is true to a lesser extent with ten and change. Unequal
distribution comes back with a vengeance during free play, when participants skewed payments
towards immediate kin and avoided distant family and friends. In Goroka K5 and K10 are politick,
acceptable denominations to allocate across a range of people. These particular denominations are
used to facilitate (ideals of) sharing or equal allocation when the distribution is made visible or pub-
licized. Interestingly, participants did not keep significantly more money for themselves during free
play either, though this plays out differently when one looks across the genders.
Table 3 displays the frequency of different denomination-sized gifts as a percentage of all distri-
butions within each scenario, regardless of who they went to. This table exhibits the sharp increase in
the number of times a person is not given any money at all during free play, 58% of the distributions.
The obvious (and perhaps universal) concomitant to this observation is that, given a choice, people
prefer not to give any money to some people. Or, as one participant put it, ‘if there is a chance to lose
them, I will lose them’.
Tables 4–7 can be compared side by side to get a sense of significant differences between them,
and making it possible to pick out variations among participants. To look for color contrasts is
also to concentrate on the denominations through which distributions occur. Table 8 below can-
not be compared like for like because it reorganizes the heat map for scenario two to coincide
with the order and groupings that participants experienced. Table 8 clarifies the importance of
giving equally to certain kinds of people when they are met together, and when it is acceptable
to override that imperative and distribute disproportionately. In the following section the
majority of observations will spring from the scrutinization of variations in the ‘heat maps’
and discussions had with participants while they made their decisions, rather than from the tables
and chart showing mean distribution values.
Table 3. Frequencies of the allocation of different sized monies as a percentage of observations for each
scenario.
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Patterns of distribution
The patterns of distribution that occurred during the skelim gem indicate a clear sphere of ‘demand-
sharing’ based on proximity among a more distant sphere of kin and among some novel relation-
ships (Peterson 1993). Skelim gem participants’ primary concern was their appearance in the eyes
of the people they met who were not close kin. Watching participants I noticed that they did not
imagine that the people they met demanded money from them, but instead anticipated a future
moment when those people learnt that the participant had won money and had kept this fact
from them, and the shame that they would feel as a result. Thus ‘demand sharing’ in this case
was not a response to real-time demand, but a pre-emptive gesture toward equality in response to
the expected dissemination of the knowledge that you had wealth. Indeed much of the general
findings drawn from the tables and our conversations were framed within the commonly voiced
competing ideals of equality and hierarchy that were described above, set against the demands of
specific kin and personal consumption.
At the same time that they are warding off future accusations of miserliness, participants sought
out immediate kin for high distribution, and men of ambition aimed at both a broader field of kin
obligations and heavily invested in novel money-centric relationships (A. Strathern 1971). During
Table 4. Individuals (scenario one).
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these latter gifts sharing was not motivated by the logical extension of the anticipated need to demon-
strate a commitment to equality so much as the capacity to exceed it and show respect in a manner
that exalted both recipient and more importantly donor.
Participants also explained that in group circumstances their distribution stands as a metonym for
their kin as a whole, conferring collective prestige (see also A. Strathern 1971, Foster 1995). Accord-
ing to one female participant a family unit will accept much smaller amounts relative to leaders and
affines because they are ‘one’ during the moment of distribution, and ‘wish their name to travel with
the outsiders.’ Their own collective equality is demonstrated by their happiness to give to a respected
outsider. Skelim gem participants were seen deciding whether to give heavily to close relatives and
abrogate responsibility or to stand for them and give to others, the latter usually done by older men
and women, the former by the young.
As each scenario began participants earmarked one or two large denominations (usually a K50
and perhaps another K20). Men often earmarked monies to spend on beer, while women fre-
quently said they would buy foodstuffs/cleaning products for the house, or bank the money
(see M. Strathern 1975, Lave 1988). Moneys such as these have a ready home: a specially
made concealed pocket called a stil poket (‘steal pocket’) (Pickles 2013a). Here we are observing
attempts to carve out what Parry and Bloch call separate ‘transactional orders’ through a
Table 5. Small groups (scenario two).
ASubstituted grandchild for father’s father. BKept some money to give to others later.
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common medium using the tropic points of denomination (1989, pp. 24–25). Those large
denominations have an integrity that is worth guarding because they are less vulnerable to
dwindling away on the stuff of everyday existence and the explicit or implicit demands of others
than a collection of small monies. A participant felt compelled to give their big note away on
only a couple of occasions, always when they met an important family member late on, after hav-
ing been too generous already. Faced with this situation participants gave the K50 away in its
entirety because it would have been unseemly to ask for change.
Threshold denominations
Table 7 is notably pale blue, dramatizing the shift from evenly spread low denomination five and
change distribution in the ambush scenario to most people giving away nothing to whole classes
Table 6. Ambush (scenario three).
APut K100 in the middle. BPut K20 in the middle for the stated purpose of buying cigarettes and small things for each person.
Spent K100 on food for everyone. Put K10 aside for people who have heard rumors to come. CTells others he only won K80.
Substitutes grandchild for father’s father. DK100 was designated for the purpose of buying alcohol for the remaining people.
EK106 was designated for the purpose of buying alcohol for everyone. FPut K90 in the middle to be spent on alcohol. GK65 was
designated for the purpose of buying alcohol for the remaining people. The earmarking of certain denominations for collective
use is elaborated upon below.
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of people in free play. This is because, for example, one K20 and one K10 given to a mother’s brother
in free play masks the thirteen times that other participants chose not to give him anything, leaving
only a mean score of K2, suggesting that participants during free play were distributing to the mass of
people in a way consonant with everyday give and take when, contrariwise, they almost always hid
from them.
Anything below K5 (i.e. two and change) is considered small money, not enough to buy any-
thing important. (At the time of fieldwork) on market tables on every street corner candies and
tobacco rolled in newspaper were sold for ten or twenty toea, betel nut for up to K1, pre-rolled
cigarettes for K1-1.20, and K3 worth of mobile phone credit was sold for K4. Nothing was sold
for as much as K5. K2 and change was therefore the kind of money that moves between people
routinely on the street, day in and day out, as one sits down for a game of cards, or passes relatives,
language-mates and neighbors. It was accompanied by phrases like ‘buy yourself a betel nut or
credit for your phone’ or, as one participant demonstrated, ‘at least buy yourself something.’ Par-
ticipants under different scenarios chose whether to use up their money on the back and forth of
daily ‘demand sharing’, or to give people something significant and memorable, or lastly to give
them nothing. Meeting people on the street in public, Gorokans often chose to give people they
Table 7. Free play (scenario four).
*Grandchild substituted for father’s father. This participant also decided to give some money to his brother (K20), and his father’s
brother (K5).
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knew inconsequential denominations that nevertheless signify their bond. The same occurred
when participants confronted a small group and wanted to give more money to one of those people
in particular but could not allow the others to feel overlooked. If they could avoid the drain of
everyday life, as they could during free play, then they did, but the threshold denomination K5
was respected as too much to give between associates in daily interaction. I recall a couple of
occasions where all I had to pass along was a K5 and having it refused as unnecessary, or being
ushered to a nearby market stall to buy something so that my intended recipient could receive
some of the change instead.
Under ambush conditions, participants chose to give away consequential denominations: five and
change or ten and change. They distributed as evenly as they could, given the constraints of denomi-
nation imposed on them. Some distinguished two groups, one receiving more and one less. Key
people received money separately, but often recipients were divided not on kin lines but on the
basis of consumption: whether they drank or whether they ate pork. Then they bought beer or
food for everyone, or gave a large note to someone to buy beer and get change. This equalized
the gifting by turning divisible money into indivisible units which must be consumed: a beer and
a full belly. By converting money into comestibles the need for absolute numerical unitization
and therefore comparison of relationships was avoided, a strategy which is inherent to large feasts
(Pickles 2014) and the opposite of the differentiation strategies made available by money in conjunc-
tion with pockets. It is telling that ambush produced the most uniform distribution pattern. Expan-
sive and exaggerated distribution preferences instituting ‘transactional orders’ of keeping vs. giving
were undercut when participants couldn’t hide money.
People really struggled with a lack of change, illustrating the importance of small denominations
in everyday life, as an example will illustrate. In preparation for a distribution event like a mortuary
feast, a mixture of K5 notes and K2 notes are acquired from the bank (Pickles 2017). These are
stuffed into envelopes until they are bloated. This makes money look visually impressive without
revealing how much is given over. The practice responds to the difficulties presented by lack of
Table 8. Small groups in the order and groupings cards were presented to participants.
Note: Cl = Colleague, D = Daughter, Fd= = Friend of equal status, RWR = Reciprocal winnings relationship, Fd> = Senior friend,
FF = Father’s father, Cm = Clansman, SP = Spouse, M =Mother, Fd< = Junior friend, St = Stranger, F = Father, H = Head of
clan/tribe, MB =Mother’s brother, SPZ = Spouse’s sister, SPB = Spouse’s brother, P = Pastor, S = Son, T = Tribesman.
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change, especially in rural settings where revealing a large note or asking for change is an invitation
to jealousy. This does not mean however that K5 is an inconsequential denomination; it is useful
because it bridges the consequential and the inconsequential, allowing participants to distribute
‘at least enough to buy something,’ as one married man put it, and still keep a good amount for
themselves.
Gender and age in distribution priorities
Given perfect secrecy during free play, of course people don’t give out all that much money. Notice
though that it was women who kept significantly more of their money, concentrating what money
they gave out to their mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters and, with one exception, skipping over
their husband completely. The one wife who did give money to her husband did so because ‘my hus-
band gives me money to look after the house and therefore when I win, I must make him happy.’
Homemaker wives are often derided for gambling, especially if they lose the money their husband
gave them for the house; one wife among the participants chose not to give money to her husband
lest he know she had been gambling. Not incidentally, many wives feel the need to gamble with their
household money because their wage-earning husband does not give them enough (Strathern 1975,
Wardlow 2006).
Men were more inclined to give twenty and change both to their immediate family and to their
gambling friend (who received nothing from any woman). Consequently men kept less for them-
selves during free play than in other scenarios. Husbands gave a large denomination (usually
K50) to their wives, citing her role as ‘mother of the house.’ During these hypothetical scenarios
it was easy to be generous, but allocating money to one’s wife was a responsibility which does not
require direct reciprocation, and that fact makes it all the harder for husbands to remember to
give them money in practice.
Table 8 demonstrates that even in mixed company outside of the home it is expected that a man
gives more money to his wife than to others. However, this is not so during ambush. At home they
needed to represent their family to outsiders and distribute to the large group as a whole and not
show favor to their wives. Participants reported feeling acute pressure to distribute fairly and accent-
uate people’s equality, hence respondents’ tendency to substitute money for more divisible goods like
food. All said there is more pressure on men to appear to be a fair distributor than there is on women,
who, they say, ‘must look first to their house.’
Mothers always received more than fathers because they ‘do more work raising children.’ A
mother, because her origin lies outside of one’s own clan, must be compensated for the transfer
of the mother’s reproductive capacities to the clan (M. Strathern 1988). The father’s father is also
important as a quasi-replacement for the self (Stasch 2009) and usually distinguished from others
by a larger donation. These distinctions follow the more-or-less ‘cognatic’ organization of
Highland peoples (Glasse 1969). Participants gave money to their close relatives quickly so that
the obligation to give to more distant people as they see them does not hit them too hard. We
may surmise therefore that equality in distribution is primarily a matter for public display, a public
good, against which people distribute secretly lest they be shamed for not abiding by the rule.
Prioritizing close kin
If confronted by a small group, participants felt that same pressure to divide equally, but certain
kinds of relationships command larger sums as a mark of their difference in small groups that
they do not during larger scale distributions. Mothers, fathers, and wives may be prioritized, though
children often lose out, because giving to the former is a matter of repaying respect to ones progeni-
tors, while to prioritize the latter is to be self-interested. Sons therefore do better during free play. In
fact compare free play (a deliberately unreal fantasy scenario) to other scenarios and it is clear that in
an ideal world participants did not give money to people unless they had either a specific obligation
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to them (mothers, fathers, and children for women, and for men mothers, fathers, and wives), or
unless they were making a tactical investment. That is to say that the give and take of everyday
life can be a big drag on people’s efforts to use money effectively when they have it, and should
be avoided if possible. While the ideal of public sharing was positively valorized, it was often imprac-
tical, punitive, and an impediment to people’s desires.
This overview of distribution dynamics serves to show that the need to demonstrate equality
and show respect for hierarchy was not uniformly expressed, and that performative adherence to
group values gains precedence slowly as group size builds, without any clear threshold. Whether
one equated oneself with the recipient, chose to equate recipients, or equated non recipients
while showing respect to a recipient were all inflected through denomination. When it came
to outsiders, people generally gave money to people they were not related to for one of two
reasons. The first is to prevent them telling others that the participant is not a good person
and does not value equality (especially if the outsider found out they had won money). Secondly
participants hoped that their generosity would travel with them, and that the recipient will likely
give the donor some money at another unexpected juncture (Pickles 2014). This was the major
dynamic in play when it came to the highly-valued gambling friend, which I now spend some
time exploring separately for the way it throws the imperative towards demonstrating equality
into contrastive relief.
Gambling friends
Unlike consanguinial and affinal relationships, which may be avoided if they are not felt to be
sufficiently supportive but could be subsequently reactivated, gambling relationships are entirely
constructed by give and take. Their point of activation is gambling itself, and so they are more
ephemeral. The gambling friend received more money than nearly all consanguinial, affinal, or
other relationships (see also Burkins 1984, p. 221). Inasmuch as gifts measure importance, the gam-
bling friend stands out as overemphasized (Mauss 1990, Gregory 1982). Money which might remain
hidden found its way easily into the hands of fellow gamblers. It is a peculiar relationship because it is
symptomatic of contingent and shifting ties that follow a logic bound up with denominational
divisions.
During free play female participants gave their gambling friend nothing at all, as did the youngest,
least independent man. Politically active men on the other hand tended to prioritize this relationship
by giving their gambling friend a K50 or a K20 in most scenarios. Most strikingly, during free play
they tended to filter out all but their immediate family and their gambling friend; friendships based
on camaraderie rather than money suffered particularly badly. The gambling friend is emblematic of
a measured and ideally balanced form of reciprocation between equals that is focused on big denomi-
nations, big gifts, and excess of all kinds (Pickles 2013b). In this K20 emerges as another threshold
denomination, it is emblematic of a significant amount. K20 is what you give to someone with the
phrase ‘go buy yourself lunch,’ knowing full well that K20 is a lot more than the average lunch costs.
Nobody (who is not elite) gives a K20 to an associate without the recipient being pricked to consider
the giver’s intentions.
A ‘bigshot’ player who has only won K100 will not usually give K20 to another ‘bigshot’ gambler
(cf. Martin 2013). This is considered below the threshold of significance, and would make one appear
small fry. The two ‘bigshots’ should transact in K100’s, enough to play a round on the slot machines
(Pickles 2013b). This relationship is often seen as a form of insurance: one participant said if the
partner ‘has more luck than me, he will increase what he gives to me,’ going on to explain that if
you are more fortunate than the partner, then it is a pleasurable thing to give and a marker of friend-
ship and status. Fortune is recognized as fickle, so this is also a strategy of evening out ones comings
and goings while strengthening relationships between friends. The money given is by no means free
or disinterested, it is considered to be like an unofficial loan, or like the classic Maussian gift (1922),
invoking bad feelings if it is not returned if and when the recipient wins later. That is why a
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participant would tell a gambling friend where they got their money while keeping the source secret
from others. Performed equality is not the issue here, but rather competitive gifting (cf. Gregory
1997, pp. 46–47).
Winnings have a time limit before the money ceases to be winnings and subsides into other mon-
etary forms. After meeting others and having given money away already the win ceases to be fresh, so
participants avoided giving to their gambling friend or telling them that they won, or they told their
gambling friend that they won but unfortunately didn’t see them. As one young female participant
put it, ‘if I brought the money home and they didn’t come to see me, then it is finished now, I won’t
give them.’
Distributing to a gambling friend is only necessary if your windfall comes from gambling. If you
are losing there is no need to pay, and if you give up gambling, you don’t need to balance your books.
The gambling friend is one version of many different relationship possibilities, all based on money.
Other examples include fellow coffee or betel nut buyers, a marketer, a government official; anyone
you know who has access to sudden windfalls and who shares them with you. The need to give to this
person is a product of the way the money was sourced, and the source of money must be factored
into the volume and value of a gift, as well as sourcing the relationship’s inception.
When participants met individuals (so as to distribute at their own discretion with only the
diminishing pile of winnings and rumor to worry about), their gambling friend received double
what they did when participants could indulge in free play. If by chance they met, men especially
took the chance to invest in the kind of money-centric relationships they think are important, but
only if they thought they had enough money in absolute and in denominative terms to do the
relationship justice. Said one participant, ‘the price of a slot machine game is K50, so you must at
least give them enough for a game.’ When adult men meet small groups that include a gambling
friend, they go out of their way to give more to them even in others company, whereas younger
men and especially women tended to either give the same amount to everyone or give less to a gam-
bling friend than a relative. Adult men stressed that gambling friends must be made to feel above
others because of their previous gifts, and doing so in the presence of others will also let him
know that the money was attained by gambling but obscuring that fact from others. Those others
will only know that the two have an important relationship, making another case of close kin
being equal to the donor by not receiving a gift. As such the donor-recipient become linked in others
eyes and will figure more prominently in others thinking of them. Reciprocation as a contingent
creative act of relationship-making outside of kinship and affinal ties is of course familiar to scholars
of Highland New Guinea, and that it should be gendered male is also predictable. Politically active
people desire transactions with others like them, and hence political elites are cemented through
gambling. K50 and K100 denominations are these days synonymous with elites in part because
they are cumbersome denominations to use in places like villages, and also because the kinds of
transactions that can be made with them and therefore the people they are given to also reflect
elite interests. The elite equality produced through them is deliberately exclusionary, producing
hierarchy.
Conclusions
Some results of the skelim gem may be highly generalizable distributive necessities that follow from
the materiality of denominations, the metric system that currently governs where denominations fall
on the spectrum of PNG money, and the standard formula used by states to control the relative
amounts of denominations in circulation (Sargent and Velde 2002). There are also specific obser-
vations regarding denomination as a resource used to (1) rank the importance of distributing to
different kinds of people, (2) mark the importance of gambling friends, to (3) express and acknowl-
edge the public gaze, (4) create threshold denominations and use them as a marker of significance,
(5) earmark large denominations and employ strategies to keep them; (6) highlight the importance of
physical presence as a prompt to ‘demand sharing,’ (7) use small denominations as an enabler to
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flexible decision-making, and (8) gender denominations and their use. These situated calculations
reveal a malleable mathematical logic of communication measured in transactions that occur
these days through fungible denominations.
‘Demand sharing,’ or transfers driven by proximity and projected knowledge are a better charac-
terization among some relationships uncovered in the skelim gem, while interested gifting or invest-
ment are present but clearly marked off as the domain of political machination (see also Deville
2012). When either situation arose in public, both were capable of eclipsing people’s desire for per-
sonal consumption or to benefit their immediate kin.
‘Demand sharing,’ ‘gift exchange,’ equality, and hierarchy take forms that are signified in denomi-
nations that are made visible in plain sight. Money and denomination are not passive in this, and
through figures like the gambling friend they come to represent their own break-away kinds of
relationship. It has been shown that denomination can be used by different actors either as a crutch
to prevent themselves from having to make distributions that they do not want to make, or as a
means of impressing how scrupulous they are in observing the equality imperative during distri-
bution. It is not possible to conclude that denomination determines action in a uniform manner
among Gorokan participants, rather denomination is a tropic point that shapes whether people
can or cannot express themselves adequately in their distribution activities. The skelim gem
prompted people to act out the types of dilemma that preoccupy people during these decisions
and give an indication of the relative priorities people have vis-à-vis the interests of immediate
kin, the expression of equality, and the desire to embrace politically motivated gifting. The discus-
sions likewise stand as testament to the resilience of these categories in contemporary Highland
Papua New Guinea.
Notes
1. For a full discussion on the utility of conceptualising transactions in terms of their component transfers, see
Pickles (in press).
2. The Jacaranda Dictionary (Mihalic 1971):
‘Skelim, (E: scale him)
(1) to weigh something or someone
(2) to balance something . . .
(3) to portion out something
(4) to judge’
3. The denominations are deliberately top heavy so as to ensure the participant would face conundrums.
4. When participants gave ‘money’ to a group to share or ‘bought’ them food/beer, they did it by putting an
amount of money aside. In the tables below I divided those moneys equally among the people concerned.
5. I did not include K2 or K1 denominations in the heat map.
6. People are ordered on the Y axis according to the mean amount of money they were given, highest at the top.
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